Indiana Law Journal
Volume 15

Issue 6

Article 3

8-1940

Powers of Sale in Chattel Mortgagors
Elvin H. Hewins
Member, Evansville Bar

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons

Recommended Citation
Hewins, Elvin H. (1940) "Powers of Sale in Chattel Mortgagors," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 15 : Iss. 6 ,
Article 3.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol15/iss6/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law
Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @
Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
rvaughan@indiana.edu.

POWERS OF SALE IN CHATTEL MORTGAGORS
By ELVIN H

HEWINS*

It is not unusual to find included in a chattel mortgage a
provision giving the mortgagor a right to sell the mortgaged
property under certain conditions or with certain duties enjoined upon him with respect to proceeds of sales. Such provisions are more generally used in mortgages covering chattels
acquired by the mortgagor for the purpose of resale in the
usual course of his business or chattels which he has prepared
for sale.
The advantage to the mortgagor from the use of this device is apparent: He is enabled to continue his business or
occupation in the usual way and yet get credit on the security
of assets, the sale of which constitutes his business activity and
furnishes his income. As to the mortgagee, he will usually
grant only short term credit on this security, and such credit
must be profitable considering the large number of concerns
offering it which have sprung up in the past few years. Leisurely sales in the regular course of business bring better
prices than forced ones and so the financial position of the
mortgagor may be strengthened and going concern and goodwill values conserved, and the mortgage debt discharged more
easily, all of which will benefit general creditors.'
But since such a security device is usually necessary only
in cases of bare solvency, it must be closely scrutinized in its
operation; for if the mortgagor, hiding under this umbrella
held by the mortgagee, appropriates proceeds of sales to his
own use which should go to general creditors a fraud is worked
on the latter.2 Similarly, purchasers of the mortgaged chattels
Of the Evansville Bar.
*
S if fairly
made with the purpose of honestly carrying it out." Vermillion v. National
Bank of Greencastle, 59 Ind. App. 35, 105 N. E. 530 (1915).
2 Particularly may the mortgagee be less diligent in holding the mortgagor
to his duties to apply proceeds properly where the credit is extended under a
revolving fund arrangement in connection with which the mortgagee has other

1'The law looks with favor on such an arrangement
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occasionally run afoul of these provisions and at times have
suffered where the conditions of the power have not been
complied with by the mortgagor or where there has been a
general default under the mortgage.
Problems involving such powers of sale have been before
the courts of this state a number of times. Some of them
were determined under certain of the statutes relating to
fraudulent conveyances and others were solved by applying
common law and equitable principles. 3 In 1935 the legislature dealt explicitly with chattel mortgages in the Chattel
Mortgage Act, 4 and in Section 6 attempted to cope specifically
with the power of sale in the mortgagor.
This Act in its general scope is sufficiently interesting to
merit a paragraph of digression before considering the manner in which Section 6 deals with the matter under discussion.
The statute is obviously designed especially to serve the purposes of the various federal agencies lending to farmers for
agricultural purposes. In Section 1 it is deemed desirable to
name these several agencies although they, like other persons
and concerns having money to lend, would be among those
"allowed by law to loan money" who are also given the benefit
of the Act. And after going into detail in ten subsections to
specify numerous agricultural products and personal property
of an agricultural nature which are eligible for mortgaging
under the Act, a single subsection is added covering other
chattels and also goods which may be acquired "for the purpose of resale in the regular course of the business of the
mortgagor." A federal judge construing a similar statute in
Kentucky was so much impressed with its evident purpose
to serve these federal agricultural lending agencies that he
concluded it did not apply to non-agricultural chattel mortgages.5 At any rate it can be said, if the intention of the
legislature is taken as that of the farmers of the Act, that
security than where the short term credit scheme is used. In any case fraud
will be very difficult to detect and an insolvency proceeding may be necessary
to determine it and protect against it.
3 Notes 23, 25, 8, 9, 10, infra.
4 Burns Ind. Stats. Ann. (1933) § 51-501 et seq. (Supp.).
5 Miller, J. in In re Ciabattari (W. Dist. Ky. 1939) 29 F. Supp. 573.
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the legislature was thinking mostly of farmers rather than
merchants. These facts are pointed out merely as matters
of interest, not that they may help in construing the Act, and
not in a spirit of criticism. Nor is it thought desirable that
the view of the federal judge be adopted. Except for language difficulties, the Act will be useful in its general application. In other sections it covers such things as additional
loans under the mortgage security and replacements and increase of mortgaged property, matters with which the Common Law at various times had difficulty because of the possibilities of fraud and the transitory nature or non-existence of
the property and impossibility of accurate description. Recordation is provided for and fees of the Recorder are r6duced in accordance with the purpose to make recordings
simple and inexpensive.
Several sections deal generally with the extent of the lien
of the mortgage; but its extent as affected by a power of sale
in the mortgagor is dealt with in Section 6; and under the
familiar rule of statutory construction this specific provision
governs this subject to the exclusion of the general ones.
Section 6 reads as follows:
"Any mortgage executed under and pursuant to this act may validly
provide that the mortgagor shall, as the agent or trustee for the mortgagee or lender or owner or holder of the secured debt, have the right
to sell or exchange any of the mortgaged chattels under the conditions
stated in said mortgage, if the proceeds of such sale or exchange are
applied upon the mortgage debt or subjected to the lien of said mortgage,
or are used solely for the purpose of paying the expenses of cultivating,
harvesting, preparing for market, processing, marketing, or otherwise
preserving or rendering merchantable or salable the remaining property
covered by said mortgage, and such provision shall not in any way
render invalid the lien of said mortgage or its preference or priority as
herein stated. Said mortgage may validly provide that purchasers need
not be required to see as to the proper application of the proceeds of the
sale. Any such sales or exchange may be made in accordance with the
provisions in the mortgage without notice to or consent of any person
claiming any right in or to the mortgaged property, and such property
received in exchange shall be as validly covered by the mortgage as the
original property." 6
6

Burns Ind. Stats. Ann. (1933) § 51-506 (Supp.).
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This section was construed for the first time in the case of
Helms v. American Security Company.7 In this case the court
was confronted with a controversy between a purchaser of
mortgaged chattels and a mortgagee, a situation found less
frequently in the cases than those involving creditors and
mortgagees. The parties to the mortgage had sought to
avail themselves fully of the benefits of Section 6. A power
was given the mortgagor to sell for cash in the regular course
of business providing the proceeds of such sales of mortgaged
property were held by the mortgagor in trust for the mortgagee and applied on the mortgage debt. And if the mortgagor should sell for other than cash the mortgagee could
elect to accept these proceeds in lieu of the lien; but until
such proceeds were actually received by the mortgagor, and
even then only after he had elected to accept them in lieu of
the lien apparently, the lien was intended to continue in full
force and effect. A hard case was presented: A woman purchased one of the several automobiles comprising the mortgaged property from the mortgagor-dealer who maintained
a sales room where the cars were exhibited for sale. She
had no actual knowledge of the recorded mortgage containing
the provision above-described. Another automobile was given
in exchange and the additional purchase price was represented
by a conditional sale contract which was immediately assigned
by the dealer to a finance company for the full amount. Upon
default of the mortgage, the mortgagee sought to replevy
this automobile, joining the purchaser and the finance company
as parties defendant. The court came to the aid of the innocent feminine purchaser and the finance company and held
that the mortgagee had no riglt of replevin against them.
As is indicated in the Helms case, it was the law prior to
the Act of 1935 that the lien of a mortgage on goods or
merchandise was invalid as against an innocent purchaser
where the mortgagor was given a power of sale. Supporting
this proposition, the court cites two cases, the first of which,
Indiana etc. Securities Co. v. Whisman,s seems indistinguish7 (Ind. 1939) 22 N. E. (2d) 822.
s 85 Ind. App. 109, 138 N. E. 512 (1926).
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able from the case before the court, and protects such a purchaser.9 In one of the best expositions of the effect of such
a power of sale to be found in Indiana cases this proposition
is assumed.' 0 And this seems to be the generally accepted
view elsewhere."
Considering the problem on its merits, it would seem to
distort this whole scheme of credit on the security of chattels
to be sold by the mortgagor to permit the purchaser to suffer
by the default of his seller. The purchaser furnishes the
means which makes possible the operation of this credit device. To cause him to suffer would be to kill the goose that
lays the golden eggs because an egg is lost. As between the
purchaser and the parties to the mortgage the device is
profitable and beneficial mostly to the latter.1 2 It is a cardinal
principle in the law that one who stands most to profit should
bear the risk and burden of loss. Another principle frequently
invoked for determining where fault and consequent liability
should lie is that one who can best avoid the loss should bear
9 Other cases have protected the purchaser by raising an estoppel against
the mortgagee based on his acts other than including a power of sale in his
mortgage. Hilligoss v. Thorpe, 80 Ind. App. 614, 141 N. E. 797 (1923) ; Benedict
v. Farlow, 1 Ind. App. 160, 27 N. E. 307 (1891) ; Carter v. Fately, 67 Ind. 427
(1879) ; Duncan v. Kimbrel, 93 Ind. App. 454-, 176 N. E. 25 (1931). Similar in
principle are the cases which even before the Uniform Conditional Sales Act,
see note 17 infra, protected the purchaser from the conditional vendee as against
the conditional vendor where the sale to the conditional vendee was for the
purpose of resale in the regular course of the latter's business or where the
property sold on condition was of a kind sold by the vendee in his business.
Winchester Wagon Works & Mfg. Co. v. Carman, 109 Ind. 31, 9 N. E. 707
(1887) ; La Porte Discount Corp. v. Bessinger, 91 Ind. App. 635, 171 N. E. 323
(1930); American Aggregates Corp. v. Wente, 100 Ind. App. 59, 190 N. E. 552
(1934).
10 Irwins Bank v. Fletcher Say. & Trust Co., 195 Ind. 669, 145 N. E. 869 at
878.
1110 Am. Jur., Chattel Mortgages, § 193; 14- C. J. S., Chattel Mortgages,
§ 262; Note (1935) 97 A. L. R. 646, 650, 660, 665 (Chattel Mortgagee's consent
to sale of mortgaged property as waiver of lien).
12 The benefit which the purchaser receives from the exchange of his money
or property for the chattel can hardly be attributed to the presence of this credit
arrangement; in these days he can usually purchase the same or a similar
chattel, with little or no inconvenience, from another seller who does not find it
necessary to have the use of such a credit device in order to offer for sale his
goods or chattels.
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its risk and burden. The mortgagee, having actual knowledge
of the facts, clearly is in a better position to avoid the loss
resulting from the mortgagor's defalcation than is the innocent purchaser. Still another principle, seldom articulated,
which the judicial process obviously utilizes for dumping
liability and loss at some point, irrespective of fault, is that
the entity concerned which can best distribute the loss should
bear it. The mortgagee who has dealt generally with the
mortgagor's credit and usually with several chattels and other
property attracts the loss under this principle rather than the
purchaser. The latter would usually be unable to recoup any
portion of his loss if he were denied rights in the chattel.
Commercial convenience and custom is still another principle
of commanding importance; and the court in the Helms case
applies it, pointing out the practical difficulties in requiring
casual purchasers of articles in retail establishments to make
a search of the county records before buying, or in seeing that
the proceeds of purchases are properly applied.
However, since the legislature has entered the field, these
observations concerning the "merits" of the problem may not
serve as bases for deciding the matter but are useful only
insofar as they may aid in resolving the probable intention
of the legislature in a case of ambiguity. If we are to avoid
judicial anarchy a court may not substitute its ideas of sound
legal principle in place of that dearly expressed by the legislature unless it first find that the principle adopted by the
legislature runs afoul of the basic law as laid down in the
Constitution.
If the legislature by Section 6 of the Act of 1935 intended
to protect the mortgagee as against an innocent purchaser of
chattels from a defalcating mortgagor with a power of sale,
there is probably no basis for a constitutional objection. It
may be more than mere words, however, to point out that
such a purpose is contrary to the usual ideas behind the
recording acts of permitting a person to hold an interest in
property by notice through public records-here it appears
to be essentially an attempt to attach a condition subsequent
to a power of agency through public notice, and this in a
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situation where even a normal agency relationship would be
little suspected. 13 This does seem somewhat capricious and
arbitrary, but probably does not exceed legislative bounds.
Thus the remaining approach to the problem is one of
statutory construction. The court in the Helms case states
that various sections of the Act "purport" to protect a mortgagee against the purchaser, but in conclusion finds that it
cannot be said that this "plainly appears" to be the intention
of the legislature. 14
It seems possible that the legislature by Section 6 of the
Act really intended the contrary, although the Section is certainly not free from ambiguity. The only mention of a purchaser in Section 6 is in the provision "Said mortgage may
validly provide that purchasers need not be required to see
as to the proper application of the proceeds of the sale."
Had the "may" in this sentence been "shall" the problem
would have been solved and the Section would have been made
consistent with previous statutory law of the state such as
Section 2 of the Uniform Fiduciary's Act 15 which protects
persons who in good faith pay money to and receive property
from a fiduciary, 16 and the analogous Section 8 of the Uniform
13 In fact it is perhaps only the legislative verbiage which would allow the
concept agency to be applied to this relationship. The mortgagor's own interest
is at times inconsistent with his being an agent for another. The observations
of the court in the Helms case are pertinent: "And if a principal may renounce
the authority of his agent to receive money after payment to him there is, in
effect, no agency at all."
14 The court feels a responsibility to utilize the authority of a prior case for
"engrafting upon the statute an exception to remove its ambiguities and avoid
its absurd and unjust consequences." Literally the words are a confession of
judicial anarchy. If the result is an "exception" and will "avoid * * *
consequences" the court is refusing to apply the statute as the legislature
intended. The court has power to do this because it stated that it did do it and
no one has said or could say it nay. But had it actually done this it would be
an exercise of anarchial power. Doubtless the court did not mean this literally;
it was simply making sense out of ambiguity and not refusing to apply the
statute.
15 Burns Ind. Stats. Ann. (1933) § 31-102.
16 The mortgagor must be made an agent or a trustee of the mortgagee under
a valid power of sale as provided in the Chattel Mortgage Act and so is a
fiduciary within the meaning of the Fiduciary's Act.
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Conditional Sales Act'

7

which protects purchasers from con-

ditional vendees. Still another statute adopting a principle
of special protection to purchasers is one among those on
frauds and perjuries which recognizes that while a trust for
the benefit of a trustor may be void as to creditors the title
of a purchaser without notice will not be affected.' 8 It seems
a possible construction that the legislature intended by this
special provision as to purchasers to make the other provisions of the section inapplicable to them and that the "may"
could be construed as "shall" so as to bring it into conformity
with other statutory law and the weight of judicial authority
and legal principle.
One thing is clear: One purpose of the other provisions
of Section 6 is to affect someone other than a purchaser in at
least one situation. This may be seen by supposing a case
where a mortgage provides, as the Section says it "may,"
that purchasers need not be required to see as to the proper
application of the proceeds of the sale, and operating under
it the mortgagor fails to account for the proceeds. (1) Certainly a purchaser would not suffer here, as there could be
no purpose in relieving him of a possible duty to see to the
application of the proceeds unless he is to be secure in his
acquisition despite improper use of the proceeds. But yet
the provision for sale is invalid because the statutory condition of validity of such a provision; viz., application of proceeds of the sale, has not been complied with. 19 (2) As
between the mortgagor and mortgagee there would be no
purpose in declaring the provision invalid: Since the mortgagee would lose his right to subject the chattel to his claim
because it had passed into the hands of the protected purchaser, he would have only a personal right against the mortgagor for breach of contract or trust; yet he would have this
right as fully as could be given him merely by the breach of
the condition of sale. Declaring the provision invalid would
17 Burns Ind. Stats. Ann. (1933) § 58-SOS (Supp.).
18 Burns Ind. Stats. Ann. (1933) § 33-411. The "notice" is in fact knowledge
since it is not contemplated that such trusts will be recorded.
19 That the condition is one restricting the validity of the provision rather
than one which may be "validly" included in the provision, see note 28 infra.
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add nothing to his right and would be idle as far as he is
concerned. Also it would be a contradiction in terms, for a
breach of contract does not make the contract "invalid";
20
indeed an action for the breach presupposes a valid contract.
The conclusion must be that in this one supposed situation at
least the provision will be invalid for some reason and to
some effect that does not concern a purchaser nor the parties
to the mortgage. (3) The only other persons who may be
involved are creditors; the provision is made invalid as against
them, for some reason that affects only them. It may be
that this provision as to invalidity because of misapplication
of proceeds is intended only for the benefit of creditors in
its general purpose and effect, as well as it clearly is in the
particular situation just mentioned.
Further observation and analysis indicates that such a conclusion may be sound. In determining the intent of the legislature, that law-making body is frequently considered to have
a knowledge of the previous law on a subject as announced
by another law-making body, the court, in decided cases.
At the time the legislature gave birth to ambiguous Section 6, concern over application of proceeds of sales had been
expressed in cases involving general creditors but not in those
involving purchasers from a mortgagor with a power of
sale.21 Thus, where the expression was used that proceeds
"were regarded as applied" it was used for the purpose of
protecting creditors. If property was sold by a mortgagor
and the proceeds were not applied in the reduction of the
mortgage debt or in strengthening the financial position of
20 5 Williston, Contracts (Rev. ed.) §§ 1301, 1302, 1303; Corbin, Discharge
of Contracts, (1913) Yale L. Jour. 513, Selected Readings on the Law of
Contracts (1931) p. 1165 at p. 1167.
21 See e. g. the two cases cited in the Helms case in connection with this idea.
The first, Indiana Investment & Securities Co. v. Whisman, 85 Ind. App. 109,
138 N. E. 512 (1926) involves a purchaser-mortgagee controversy and does not
use this language; the second, Vermillion v. Nat]. Bank of Greencastle, 59 Ind.
App. 35, 105 N. E. 530 (1915), involves creditor-mortgagee controversies and
does employ the expression in determining rights. Further as to purchasers see
Hilligoss v. Thorpe, 80 Ind. App. 614, 141 N. E. 797 (1923) and cases cited.
Further as to creditors see General Highways System, Inc. v. Thompson, 88 Ind.
App. 179, 155 N. E. 262, 156 N. E. 407 (1927) and cases cited.

POWERS OF SALE IN CHATTEL MORTGAGORS

the mortgagor, general creditors were injured because their
equity in the assets of the mortgagor was reduced; and the
mortgagee, who made this injury possible by removing this
property from the reach of process, was penalized by having
his debt reduced as against the creditors in the amount of the
misapplied proceeds. Unless the words of the Section too
clearly literally include purchasers it seems they might be
thrown with their former companions, creditors, and forbade
introduction to new associates.
Looking further to the case-law on this subject prior to
the entrance of the legislature, it is observed that in early
decisions in this state, powers of sale in chattel mortgagors
were declared invalid as a fraud on creditors irrespective of
their actual effect. 22 The view was taken that such a device
constituted a trust in favor of the trustor and so was invalid
under the statute condemning such set-ups. 23 And this view
was adopted in a well-reasoned opinion of the Supreme Court
of the United States in determining the effect of such a power
under Indiana law. 24 But these cases were in effect overruled
later and the principle was announced as required by the
statute to the effect that fraud was always a question of
"fact, ' 2 5 that the actual operative effect of such a provision
was to be looked to in order to determine its validity. 26 In
determining this question of "fact" the court in these later
cases observed whether or not the proceeds of sales were
actually applied in reduction of the preferred mortgage debt
or to enhance the financial position of the mortgagor or in
any other way which did not reduce the equity of general
creditors in the assets of the mortgagor. If so, it was resolved that the scheme was not fraudulent and it was upheld.
22 Mobley v. Letts, 61 Ind. 11 (1878); Davenport v. Foulke, 68 Ind. 382
(1879). These cases suggest that an agreement in the mortgage to account for
proceeds would have avoided this result however.
23 Burns Ind. Stats. Ann. (1933) § 33-409.
24 Robinson v. Elliott, 22 Wall. 513, 22 L. Ed. 758 (1874). Sufficient facts
as to operative effect were discussed however that the arrangement could have
been condemned as fraudulent on this basis.
25 Burns Ind. Stats. Ann. (1933) § 33-412.
26 For this development see Irwins Bank v. Fletcher Say. & Trust Co., 195
Ind. 669, 145 N. E. 869, 878 (1924).
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The wording and punctuation of Section 6 is capable of the
interpretation that the legislature was really cognizant of this
historical development and intended to provide in relation to
it. Probably the purpose was simply to prevent any possible
reversion to the old rule which struck down these powers of
sale without inquiring into their operative effect, or as was
often said, as fraudulent per se or fraudulent as a matter of
"law. ' 217 It seems that it was merely desired to insure that a
pragmatic view would be taken in regard to these powers when
provided for in a mortgage. Thus, Section 6 directs that (the
mere presence of) "such provision shall not in any way render
invalid the lien of said mortgage or its preference or priority
as herein stated." But the provision itself may be invalid if
it does not work right: The mortgage may "validly provide"
for a power of sale in the mortgagor (only) "if," (1) the
27 Doubtless everyone versed in legal lingo knows what a court means by
using such expressions, but analysis and thought will show that they are not
accurate to describe the meaning. Nothing is fraudulent "in itself"; there is a
fact to which the law attaches the label and legal consequences of "fraud."
And we are dealing in this field of law only with things which are fraudulent
as a matter of law; there is nothing to compare with this description of the
result; i. e. no alternative from fraud as a matter of law. Thus when the
statute (see note 25, supra) says fraud shall be a question of "fact" it has little
meaning. Its purpose doubtless was to prevent the attaching of the label and
legal consequences of "fraud" to slight facts capable as well of being part of a
factual situation which if relatively more fully known the law would not call
"fraud," as of being part of a fraudulent one. It seems on this analysis that all
that is meant is that for the law to attach the legal consequences of fraud to one
of these credit arrangements more facts must be shown than the single fact
that the parties have included in their mortgage a provision giving a power of
sale to the chattel mortgagor.
In answer,
28 Issue will be taken with this construction of the Section.
consider the effect of the comma before the word "if" as compared with its
omission.
With the comma out, the clause following "if" describes what the provision
for the power of sale may "validly provide." Such a provision containing all
these conditions (which may be validly included in it) would not render the
lien of the mortgage invalid nor affect its priority according to the last clause
of the sentence. This-would mean that a breach of one of these conditions in
the power would give rise to a right to assert the lien of the mortgage in the
goods whatever had happened to them. The conditions of the power would be
terms of the lien, binding all persons claiming rights in the goods. The power
would be coextensive with the lien. Doubtless the appellee in the Helms case
attached this meaning to the Section and the court could not positively refute it.
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proceeds of sales are applied on the mortgage debt or (2)
subjected to the lien of the mortgage or (3) used solely for
rendering salable the remaining property covered by the
mortgage. In order to determine whether or not these conditions are complied with obviously the power must be observed
in operation; and thus the pragmatic view of the later cases
is compelled.
If it be true that the legislature was merely covering this
previous case-law development, these provisions apply only to
mortgagee-creditor controversies, since the case-law development concerned only these controversies and not those between
mortgagees and purchasers. 2 Furthermore, a fair inference
from the obvious effect of compliance with the three conditions
to validity of the powers of sale is that the purpose of the
legislature was to protect the equity of general creditors in
the assets of the mortgagor from possible injurious effects
from the operation of this device rather than to give any
rights to the mortgagee against purchasers. The emphasis
seems to be upon financial status of the mortgagor rather than
upon rights for the mortgagee. Certainly the latter has no
sacred claim on proceeds of sales and his rights do not ripen
The writer has reason to believe that the framers of the Act intended it to be
this way but it is not their intention but the fictitious one of the legislature
which controls, this intention being determined if possible from the ordinary
meaning of words and symbols employed.
On the other hand with the comma present, the clause following "if" sets up
conditions to the validity of the power itself instead of conditions which may be
validly included in the power. And it is only a provision setting up the power,
so conditioned, which does not render the lien invalid nor affect its priority.
If these restrictive conditions are not complied with the provision is invalid and
the lien is lost to that extent. This result is not spelled out in the Section but
that can be its only meaning. The legislature says to parties, "You may include
in your mortgage lien a term or provision giving the mortgagor a power to sell
the goods, but your provision will be valid only if these three conditions are
complied with." Surely the legislature did not mean that if the mortgagor
failed to comply with the conditions thus making the provision invalid the
mortgagee could call the goods back under the lien and try it again.
Had the legislature intended the lien to follow the goods passing under the
power where the conditions had been violated the simple expedient of omitting
the comma before "if" instead of putting one there would have accomplished
this purpose clearly.
20 See note 21 supra.
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simply because proceeds are misapplied, as the last two conditions are satisfied and the provision is valid3 0 though the
proceeds do not reach his hands.3 '
As has been previously indicated, 32 inapt language was used
if the purpose was to give any rights to the mortgagee other
than not to have his provision stricken as fraudulent on its
face. Instead of providing conditions to the validity of the
provision for a power of sale, the extent of the mortgagee's
lien should have been described. When the provision is
declared invalid upon non-compliance with the conditions it
must mean that the lien and the debt it secures is invalid as
to third parties to the extent it is affected by the power wrongly
used.3 3
Such a phrase as "the remaining property covered by said
mortgage" used in Section 6 certainly gives the inference that
30 Probably the mortgagee can take away these last two conditions by so
providing in the mortgage, and the mortgagor could not claim a right so to use
the proceeds without being in default. But such a situation would not harm
general creditors and the purpose of the section would be served. Nor would
the principle gathered from the three conditions be diminished by this right of
the mortgagee.
31 It is extremely interesting in this connection that it does not appear in the
Helms case that the proceeds of the sale of the automobile sought to be replevied
were not applied on the mortgage debt. The case so far as it can be determined
proceeds upon the assumption that the mortgagee's rights are the same
irrespective of the application of these particular proceeds. There were several
vehicles under the mortgage and "upon default of its mortgage" the mortgagee
sued.
32 Text preceding note 20 supra.
33 See note 28 supra. The Act does not prescribe in detail the effect of this
invalidity. But if the intention is as claimed, that the doctrine of the more
recent cases dealing with these powers is implicit in the Section, then the manner
in which those cases work out the details is adopted. Goods sold are freed of
the lien but the lien is not impaired as to the remaining chattels except in an
insolvency proceeding. In such a proceeding, gathering the mortgagor's assets
into a single fund, the preferred mortgage debt is reduced as against creditors
in an amount equal to the value of chattels sold for which proceeds have been
misapplied. Any proceeds still held by the mortgagor should perhaps be given
to the mortgagee if he can trace them into the debtor's estate using the rules
for tracing trust funds such as these are. As to proceeds used to render salable
the remainder of the property under the mortgage only expenditures reasonably
necessary and those having an ascertainable relation to the purpose are proper.
For these principles see Vermillion v. Natl. Bank of Greencastle, 59 Ind. App.
35, 105 N. E. 530 (1915).
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as property is sold under the power of sale it passes out from
under the lien of the mortgage leaving "remaining property"
under it. Also, under the last sentence of the Section, when
the sale is made in exchange for other property, and this
property is to be "as validly covered by the mortgage as the
original property," certainly, as the court states in the Helms
case, it was not intended that both that sold and that received
should continue under the lien.
Assembling all these ideas, the conclusion must be that the
legislature by the words used in Section 6, fairly construed in
themselves and in the light of their previous use, intended only
to protect a power of sale device when it was used properly,
and instead of giving a mortgagee rights upon its misuse, he
was to lose thereby to the extent general creditors were injured
by his "expression of confidence ' 3 4 in the mortgagor. It was
never once contemplated or intended that a purchaser should
suffer from its wrongful operation.
34 So termed in Robinson v. Elliott supra note 24.

